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[L. A. No. 22926. In Bank. May 11, 1954.] 
ELSAN H. S'fAFFORD, Appellant, v. ELLWOOD L. 
SHULTZ et al., Respondents. 
[1] Physicians-Malpractice-Pleading.--Allegations of complaint 
against physicians in malpractice case that plaintiff was under 
exclusive care of each defendant or group thereof for certain 
specified period of time, and that defendants were at all times 
practicing as physicians and surgeons in county, are sufficient 
to show rPlationship of patient and physician between plaintiff 
and defendants and legal duty flowing therefrom. 
[2] Id.-Malpractice-Pleading.-Allegations of complaint against 
physicians in malpractice case setting forth in detail negligent 
acts and omissions of all defendants and stating, that as a 
direct and proximate result thereof, plaintiff was injured and 
suffered damage thereby, while inartistically phrased and set 
forth, are sufficient to state. a cause of action against all de-
fendants. 
[3] Limitation of Actions- Commencement of Period- Tort.-
Cause of action against physicians for damages arising from 
negligent treatment of wounded leg is barred by Code Civ. 
Proc., § 340, subd. 3, .where negligent acts and omissions com-
plained of took place more than one year prior to commence-
ment of action. 
[4] !d.-Commencement of Period-Tort.-The statute of limita-
tions does not commence to run in cases involving fraudulent 
concealment until plaintiff discovers his injury, or through use 
of reasonable diligence should have discovered it. 
[ 5a, 5b] Physicians-Malpractice- Actions- Limitations.-Fidu-
ciary relationship of physician and patient excused plaintiff 
in malpractice case from greater diligence in determining cause 
of his injury, and knowledge that his leg was to be amputated 
did not put him on notice that cause thereof was negligence 
on part of defendants where he did not have knowledge 
or notice until a later date that defendants knew or concealed 
from him the seriousness of his condition. 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 126; Am.Jur., Limita-
tion of Actions, § 160 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 8, 9, 11] Physicians, §55; [3, 6] 
Limitation of Actions,§ 82; [4] Limitation of Actions, § 80; [5] 
Physicians, §54; [7] Limitation of Actions, § 115; [10) Pleading, 
§18; [12] Notice, §2; [13, 14] Physicians, §61; [15] Parties, 
§ 46(2). 
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[6a, 6b] Limitation of Actions--Commencement of Period-Tort.-
Cause of action against for negligent amputation of 
leg is not barred by Code Civ. Proc., § :HO, subd. 3, where orig-
inal complaint was filed less than one year after leg was am-
putated. 
[7] !d.-Suspension of Statute-Concealment of Cause of Action. 
-A defendant, who fraud m· deceit <:oncenls material 
facts and by misreprPsentations hinders plaintiff from bring-
ing action within statutory period, is estopped from taking 
advantage of his own wrong. 
[8] Physicians- Malpractice- Pleading.-A demurrer in a mal-
practice case on ground that several causes of action were 
united but not separately stated was not well taken where 
each cause of action against each defendant or group thereof 
was stated separately not only as to defendants but as to period 
of time during which plaintiff was under care and treatment 
of such defendant or defendants. 
[9] Id.-Malpractice-Pleading.-It is not necessary for plaintiff 
in a malpractice case to allege in what respect the treatment 
given him might have bC'en deficient so long as allegations of 
complaint charged breach of c. legal duty, proximate causa-
tion and resulting damage. 
[10] Pleading-Subject Matter-Surplusage.-Matter in a plead-
ing which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative 
facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded. 
[11] Physicians- Malpractice- Pleading. -Negligence may be 
pleaded in general terms in malpractice cases. 
[12] Notice- Constructive Notice.-Physicians' reports to State 
Compensation Insurance Fund do not constitute "public 
records" so as to give constructive notice as provided for by 
Civ. Code, § 19. 
[13] Physicians-Malpractice-AppeaL--A contention that plain-
tiff's complaint in a malpractice case does not state a cause of 
action because a surgeon does not undertake to perform a cure 
nor contract to use highest degree of care, but will use ordi-
nary care and skill as tested by practice of responsible mem-
bers of his profession in his community, is a matter of evidence 
and may not be validly raised on appeal from a judgment 
entered after sustaining, without leave to amend, of a de-
murrer to complaint. 
[14] Id.- Malpractice- Appeal.-A contention that plaintiff's 
allPgations in a malpractice case concerning allegedly false 
representations made to him did not concern existing facts 
"but were in the nature of a prophecy as to the events to 
[7] See Cal.Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 161; Am.Jur., Limita-
tions of Actions, § 231. 
[10] See Cal.Jur., Pleading, § 11; Am.Jur., Pleading, §§ 51, 52. 
[15] 
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happen in nor. valid 
objection to "'"'~'"'·v"·"··.Y 
joindm' of defendant has no merit on where no 
demurrer to complaint was interposed on that ground. (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 430.) 
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los 
.Angeles County. Philbrick McCoy and Roy L. Herndon, 
Judges. Reversed . 
.Action for damages for negligent treatment of bullet wound 
in leg. Judgments of dismissal on sustaining general de-
murrers to fifth amended reversed. 
Elsan H. Stafford, in pro. per., for .Appellant. 
Fulcher & Wynn, Highsmith & Allen and Bauder, Gilbert, 
Thompson & Kelley for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff appeals from judgments1 of dis-
missal entered upon the sustaining without leave to amend 
of all defendants' demurrers to his fifth amended complaint. 
Plaintiff, Elsan H. Stafford,2 in his fifth amended com-
1The following matter is not raised by any of the parties but appears 
from the record. On Novmnber 19, 1952, judgment of dismissal was 
entered for defendants Shultz and Meier whose demurrer had been sus-
tained without leave to amend on November 12, 1952. 
On January 5, .1958, judgment of dismissal was enterefl in favor of 
defendant Arthur Ferree whose demurrer had been sustained, without 
leave to amend, on December S, 1952. 
On January 7, 1958, judgment of dismissal was entered in favor of 
defendants William Kelpien and Elizabeth Kelpien whose demurrer had 
been sustained, without leave to amend, on October 31, 1.953 [sic]. 
On January '7, 1958 (by the same judgment as that which related to 
defell<lants Kelpien) judgment of dismissal wns entered ns to defendant 
John D. Gillis whose demurrer had been sustained, without leave to 
amend, on October 31, 1958 [sic]. 
In other words, there are three separate judgments of dismissal in 
this case. Plaintiff's single notice of appeal was filed on January 8, 
1953 and specifically noticed an appeal from each of the three judgments. 
2Plaintiff appears in propria persona. His eomplaint is rambling and 
inartistically drawn. It shows a lack of knowledge of the legal principles 
involved in this type of action. I have endeavored to set forth the facts, 
as he alleges them, in somewhat more logical order so as to facilitate 
understanding of the principles involved. The complaint itself is set up 
in two causes of action as to each defendant, or group thereof. The 
allegations of the first cause concern the alleged negligent acts of the 
various defendants with separate paragraphs for each defendant, or 
group thereof; the second cause of action incorporates, by reference, the 
allegations of the first and, in addition, contains allegations of fraudulent 
representations and concealment on tl1e part of eaeh defendant, or group 
thereof. 
42 C.2d-25 
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plaint ("For damages occasioned by Malpractice and Because 
of False representations") alleges, substantially, as follows: 
Statement of Facts: Plaintiff alleges that on or about 
February 25, 1949, during the time when he was a deputy 
sheriff of the county of Los Angeles and while acting in the 
line of duty, he was wounded in the left leg by the accidental 
discharge of his pistol. He states that the bullet pierced his 
left leg about eight inches above the knee; that he was taken' 
to the Angeles Emergency Hospital and placed under the 
utre of defendants Ellwood L. Shultz, Woodrow Meier and 
Arthur Ferree for treatment; that prior to that time he was 
in good health and all his body members and functions were 
intact and unimpaired. 
l''msT CAusE o:B' AcTION AaAINS'l' DEFENDANTS SHULTZ, 
MEIER, AND FERREE 
Plaintiff alleges that from the time of the injury until 
about March 6, 1949, he was under the care of the above-
named defendants; that on the day of the injury, his injured 
leg was X-rayed; that he did not know, but that defendants 
did know, the extent of his injuries; that plaintiff is informed 
and believes that after the bullet pierced his left leg, it coursed 
downward and lodged on the exterior side thereof about six 
inches above the ankle; that in its course, the bullet damaged 
a section of the popliteal (knee area) artery about one inch 
in length but did not completely sever it; that the bullet 
severed the sciatic nerve. He alleges upon information and 
belief that while under anaesthetic these defendants removed 
the bullet, severed and removed the damaged section of the 
popliteal artery and ligated (tied or bound) the severed ends 
but that said defendants ''then made no effort to repair either 
said damaged artery or said severed Sciatic Nerve." He 
states that the care and treatment given him consisted of blood 
transfusions, sedatives, penicillin injections, ice packs, and 
occasional dressing of the wound and incision ; that during the 
ten days these defendants treated him, the calf of his left leg 
remained considerably extended "by reason of neglect of said 
defendants to remove said accumulated blood.'' He alleges 
that in order to effect a cure, defendants should have repaired 
the artery and nerve; should have removed the accumulated 
blood. He alleges that defendants had the means to obtain 
knowledge as to whether or not his leg was infected whereas 
he had no such knowledge or means of obtaining the same. 
He then alleges that defendants neglected to take any addi-
tional X-ray pictures of his left leg. 
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Plaintiff further alleges that on April 12, 1949, he was 
again placed under tbe care of defendants Shultz, Meier and 
l11 erree for treatment which consisted of sedatives, penicillin 
injections and occasional dressing of tbe wounds; that from 
April 12, 1949 until September 15, 1949, only one X-ray was 
taken which was on May 5, 1949. He alleges that during this 
time, considerable pus drained from the incisions; that he was 
almost continually confined to his bed; that he ran a temper-
ature and had chills and was delirious; that during this 
time his health became impaired and the incisions did not 
heal. He alleges that defendants should have repaired the 
artery and nerve, cleansed the infection from the leg and 
combated the infection of the bones which was present on 
May 5, 1949, and thereafter. 
SECOND CAUSE OJ<' AcTION i~GAINST DEJ<'ENDANTS SHULTZ, 
MEIER, AND FERREE 
Plaintiff alleges that during the three weeks these defend-
ants treated him, they represented to him that they had 
severed and ligated only one of the two arteries into which the 
popliteal artery branches; that it was not then necessary to 
repair or restore either the damaged artery, or the severed 
sciatic nerve ''in order to effect a cure'' of the left leg; that 
the accumulated blood in the injured leg would be absorbed 
by natural process; that plaintiff believed said representa-
tions to be true and relied thereon. 
"B1 IRST CAUSE or<' AcTION AGAINS'r DEFENDANTS 
WILLIAM KELPIEN AND ELIZABETH KELPIEN 
Plaintiff alleges that about March 6, 1949, he was removed 
to the Beverly Hospital in Montebello and placed under the 
care of these defendants where he remained for about three 
weeks; that the treatment given him by these defendants 
consisted of sedatives, penicillin injections and the occasional 
dressing of his wounds. He alleges that in order ''to have 
insured a cure'' of his leg, these defendants should have re-
paired the damaged popliteal artery and sciatic nerve; should 
have removed the accumulated blood from the injured leg 
and should have kept the leg free from infection; that they 
negleeted to take any X-ray pictures of the leg; that they 
had means of obtaining the knowledge as to whether the bones 
of the leg were infected whereas he had no such knowledge 
or means of obtaining the same. 
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SEcOND CAUSE OF AcTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS 
WILLIAM KELPIEN AND ELIZABETH KELPIEN 
That during the three weeks these defendants treated him, 
they represented that they knew the facts of his case; that 
they would effect a cure of the left leg; that it was not 
necessary to the artery which defendants Shultz, 
Meier and Ferree had severed and or to repair the 
severed sciatic nerve in order to effect a cure; that the accumu-
lated blood would be absorbed natural process; ''that they 
knew the condition of said left leg without taking X-ray pic-
tures thereof; that the proper measures were being taken to 
guard against infection of said left leg"; that plaintiff be-
lieved said representations to be true and relied thereon. 
:B'rRsT CAusE oF AcTION AGAINST DEFENDANT 
JoHN D. GILLIS 
'l'hat about March 29, 1949, plaintiff was removed to the 
Good Samaritan Hospital and placed under the care of de-
fendant Gillis for treatment where he remained for about two 
weeks; that during this time an anaesthetic was administered 
to him for the purpose of making skin grafts over the incision 
in the popliteal space of his left leg. He alleges on informa-
tion and belief that while he was under the anaesthetic, de-
fendant Gillis made the skin grafts and several other incisions 
and drained therefrom ''fully five hundred cubic Centimeters 
of old blood clots and pus matter." He alleges that when he 
was discharged from the hospital on April 12, 1949, con-
siderable pus matter was still draining from the incisions 
and that he was not then cured; that to have insured a cure, 
defendant should have repaired the damaged artery and the 
severed nerve and should have thoroughly cleansed the leg 
of all accumulated old blood clots and pus matter and "to 
have taken proper measures to gu·ard against infection'' and 
to "combat any infection"; that plaintiff had no way of know-
ing whether .infection had developed in the bones of the leg 
but that defendant had the means of obtaining such informa-
tion; that defendant neglected to take X-ray pictures of the 
injured leg. 
Plaintiff further alleges that about September 2, 1949, de-
fendant Gillis informed him that the condition of the left leg 
was seriously endangering plaintiff's general health; that 
the left leg would never be of ''any material use and benefit''; 
that the left leg should be amputated; that plaintiff believed 
and relied on these representations and "became interested in 
saving his life and lost interest in saving his le.ft leg." 
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Plaintiff alleges that during the time he was under this de-
fendant's care, the defendant represented to him that it was 
reasonable to expect a cure of his left ; that it was not 
necessary to repair and restore the severed and artery 
in ''order to effect a cure'' ; that he knew the condition of the 
leg without taking thereof; that all the old accumu-
lated blood and pus would adequately drain from the incisions 
in the calf; that no infection was then present; that plaintiff 
believed these representations to be true and relied thereon. 
Plaintiff alleges that his leg was amputated by defendant 
Gillis on September 22, 1949, at about midthigh; that he is 
informed and believes that with the application of the proper 
knowledge and skill the left leg could have been saved. 
Plaintiff alleges that during all the time defendants were 
caring for him, he was in no co~dition to make an investiga-
tion and had no means of discovering why his left leg was 
not cured ; that the defendants led him to believe at all times 
prior to September 2, 1949, that his leg would be cured. 
Plaintiff alleges that on August 2, 1950. the State Com-
pensation Insurance Fund of California served upon him 
copies of reports made by certain of these defendants 
(Shultz, Meier, Ferree and Gillis) which showed that the 
popliteal artery, and not one of the branches, had been dam-
aged; that the X-ray taken on May 5, 1949, disclosed that 
ostitis, periostitis, ''possibly approaching the Osteomyelitis 
stage'' had developed in the left leg and had infected the bones 
thereof; that on September 16, 1949, the infection had spread 
throughout the tibia and fibula of the left leg as far as the 
knee joint and that the knee joint and lower part of the 
femur were infected. 
A.s to all defendants, it is alleged that plaintiff had no 
information or belief as to when his leg became infected; or 
as to which defendant was treating him at the time; that all 
defendants contributed to his infection and neglected to 
combat or cure the same ; that none of the defendants ever 
consulted him concerning his case or the treatment thereof; 
that all the defendants were "careless, negligent and un-
skillful in diagnosing plaintiff's case and in prescribing for 
and treating him and his left leg; that all the defendants lacked 
the necessary knowledge and skill to properly diagnose plain-
tiff's case and properly prescribe for and treat him and his 
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left leg"; "that the acts and omissions of the defendants were 
the direct and proximate cause of great and irreparable loss 
and damage unto plaintiff.'' 
As to all defendants it is alleged that their representations 
were made by them without reasonable grounds upon which 
to base them and that said representations were false; that 
had he known the falsity thereof, he would have required the 
services of competent physicians and surgeons to care for 
him; that had he known the facts disclosed by the reports, he 
would have ''commenced this action for damages well within 
one year of the commission by the defendants of the acts and 
omissions complained of.'' 
All defendants demurred, either singly, or in groups, on 
the grounds that no cause of action had been stated; that 
several causes of action were not separately stated; that the 
complaint was uncertain, ambiguous and unintelligible in 
specified particulars; and that plaintiff's cause of action, if 
any, ·was barred by the provisions of section 340 ( 3) of the 
Code of Civil Procedure. 
CAusE oF AcTION 
All defendants demurred to plaintiff's fifth amended com-
plaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to 
constitute a cause of action against each of them. 
In Greninger v. Fischer, 81 Cal.App.2d 549, 552 [184 P.2d 
694], a malpractice case, defendants' general and special de-
mur-rers were sustained without leave to amend. The court 
reversed the juclgments entered thereon. It was held there 
that "It is quite obvious that these allegations set forth a legal 
duty, breach thereof, proximate causation and resulting dam-
age. That is all that is required. In this state negligence may 
be pleaded in general terms, and that is as true of malpractice 
cases as it is of other types of negligence cases. Moreover, 
in a malpractice case, it is sufficient, at least as far as a general 
demurrer is concerned, to aver that certain treatment was 
negligently administered by defendant to plaintiff's damage 
without alleging in what respect the treatment may have been 
deficient. (Guilliams v. Hollywood Hospital, 18 Cal.2d 97 
[114 P.2d 1]; Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 26 Cal.2d 
149 [157 P.2d 1]; Criss v. Angelns Hospital Assn., 13 Cal. 
App.2d 412 [56 P.2d 1274] ; Abos v. Martyn, 31 Cal.App.2d 
705 [88 P.2d 797] ; Smith v. Beancharnp, 71 Cal.App.2d 250 
[162 P.2d 662] ; see notes 33 Cal.L.Rev. 248, 264; 35 CaLL 
Rev. 267, 269.)" 
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[1] Plaintiff here has alleged that he was under the ex-
clusive care of each defendant, or group thereof, for certain 
specified periods of time; that these defendants were at all 
times practicing as physicians and surgeons in the county of 
Los Angeles. These allegations are sufficient to show the re-
lationship of patient and physician between plaintiff and 
defendants and the legal duty flowing therefrom. [2] Plain-
tiff alleged in detail the negligent acts and omissions of all de-
fendants and that as a direct and proximate result thereof, 
he was injured and suffered damage thereby. \Vhile in-
artistically phrased and set forth, it appears clearly that the 
allegations of the complaint are sufficient to state a cause of 
action (without reference to the statute of limitations) against 
all defendants. As is hereinafter set forth, plaintiff's second 
cause of action, which incorporated the allegations of the first, 
was also sufficient in alleging facts adequate to toll the statute 
of limitations. 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
All defendants demurred to plaintiff's complaint on the 
ground that it was barred by the provisions of section~340, sub-
division 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure. In H~tysman v. 
Kirsch, 6 Cal.2d 302, 306 [57 P.2d 908], we held that an action 
by a patient against a physician for injuries sustained by the 
former, by reason of the negligent or unskilled treatment of 
the latter, is an action sounding in tort and not upon a con-
tract. Such an action is therefore barred by the provisions 
of subdivision 3 of section 340 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure one year after the date of the injury. [3] It is ap-
parent from the allegations in plaintiff's complaint so far as 
his first cause of action is concerned, that the negligent acts 
and omissions complained of took place more than one year 
prior to the commencement of the action with the filing of the 
original complaint on September 12, 1.950. 'fhe demurrers, 
with the exception of that of defendant Gillis were, without 
more appearing, well taken to the first cause of action. 
In the second cause of action, however, plaintiff alleges 
that defendants made certain misrepresentations to him con-
cerning the treatment necessary to "effect a cure" of his 
leg; that they misrepresented the extent of his injnr.v; that 
they neglected to repair the injured artery and nerve and 
represented to him that sueh I'epair was not npeessary to ''effect 
a cure"; that they represented to him that they knew the 
condition of his leg without taking X-ray pictures; that all 
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of these representations were made without reasonable grounds 
upon which to base them; that the representations were false 
and that had he known the falsity thereof, he would have re-
quired the services of physicians to care for him 
and, further, would have his action well within the 
one-year As heretofore noted, plaintiff is appearing 
in propria persona and his is most awkwardly 
drawn. From the allegations it appears that he is 
charging all defendants with negligent treatment and care 
and with the failure to make a correct diagnosis by reason of 
a failure to take X-ray pictures of his leg as well as with a 
fraudulent concealment from him of his true condition while 
assuring him that they knew the condition of his leg without 
taking X-ray pictures thereof; that he is charging all de-
fendants with falsely representing to him that it was reason-
able to expect a cure of his leg. 
Taking the allegations of the complaint as true, as we are 
bound for the purpose of this appeal to do, it would appear 
that plaintiff's leg was amputated on September 22, 1949 and 
that he first lmev,r of the necessity therefor on September 2, 
1949. He further alleges, however, that defendants Shultz, 
Meier and Ferree had made reports to the State Insurance 
Compensation Fund, based on X-rays taken by them on May 5, 
1949, which disclosed that "Ostitis, Periostitis, possibly ap-
proaching the Osteomyelitis stage, had developed in said left 
leg and infected the bones thereof"; and that "on or about 
August 2. 1950, the State Compensation Insurance Fund of 
California, served copies on plaintiff of [these] reports made 
by certain defendants of plaintiff's case. That plaintiff had no 
reason to believe and did not know said reports had been made 
or existed, before said time.'' The essence of these allegations 
is that while plaintiff knew his leg would have to be amputated 
and that it was later amputated, he did not know that the 
amputation was necessary because of the negligent care given 
him by the defendants until on August 2, 1950, he received 
the reports made by them. 
[4] The rule has been stated (Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 
55 Cal.App.2d 158, 160 [130 P.2d 181]) that the statute of 
limitations does not commence to run until the plaintiff dis-
covered his injury, or through the use of reasonable diligence, 
should have discovered it (Bowman v. McPheeters, 77 Cal. 
App.2d 795, 798 [176 P.2d 745]; Sears v. Rule, 27 Cal.2d 
131, 147 [163 P.2d 443]). We must then determine whether 
the knowledge received by plaintiff on September 2, 1949, that 
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his leg must be 
had been 
of. (See also 
[185 P.2d 851] Faith v. 
[126 P.2d 151] ; Petrucci v. 
562 [111 P.2d ; M(J;rsh 
Cal. 338 [18 P.2d 933].) 
hlm on notice that defendants 
in the treatment and care there-
82 CaLApp.2d 176, 182 
52 Cal.App.2d 228, 230 
43 Cal.App.2d 561, 
v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 217 
In Bowman v. 77 Oal.App.2d 795, 800 [176 
P.2d 745], the court said: "Perhaps the most significant 
feature in the case which makes inapplicable the 
doctrine of constructive notice is the existence of the rela-
tionship between the parties of physician and patient, which in 
contemplation of law is a one. (20 Cal.Jur., p. 1072, 
§ 20.) As fiduciaries it was the duty of defendants to make 
a full and fair disclosure to plaintiff of all facts which ma-
terially affected his and interests. This principle has 
been applied and expressed in one form or another in several 
recent decisions specifically with the question of 
fraudulent concealment of a cause of action in its relation to 
the statute of limitation. (Hansen v. Bear Film Co., Inc., 28 
Cal.2d 154, 178-179 [168 P.2d 946]; Sears v. Rule, 27 Cal.2d 
131, 148 [163 P.2d 443]; BoUinger v. National Fire Ins. Co., 
25 Cal.2d 399, 411 [154 P.2d 399] ; Pashley v. Pacific Elec. 
Ry. Co., supra [25 OaL2d 226 (153 P.2d 325)], at page 235.)" 
In Hobart v. Hobart Estate 26 Oal.2d 412, 440 [159 
P.2d 958], it was said that it was in cases involving 
a fiduciary relationship that "facts which would ordinarily 
require investigation may not excite suspicion, and that the 
same degree of diligence is not required'' of the injured 
person. (See also Rutherford v. Rideout Bank, 11 Cal.2d 
479, 486 [80 P.2d 978, 117 A.L.R. 383]; Bainbridge v. Stoner, 
16 Cal.2d 423, 430 [106 P.2d 423] .) In Pashley v. Pacific 
Elec. Ry. Co., 25 Cal.2d 226, 235 (153 P.2d 325], we said: 
''As determined in those cases, the confidence growing out of 
the relationship of doctor and imposed upon the 
physician the of refraining from fraudulent conceal-
ment, that is, the duty of disclosure when he had knowledge 
of the facts. . . . Where there is a duty to disclose, the dis-
closure must be full and and any material conceal-
ment or misrepresentation will amount to fraud sufficient to 
entitle the party to an action. (Kimball v. 
Pacific' Gas & Elec. Co., supra, at p. 219 [220 Cal. 203 (30 
P.2d 39)]; Vance v. Suprerne Lodge, su,pra [15 Cal.App. 178 
(114 P. 83)] .) Since its voluntary undertaking placed upon 
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the defendant the duty to disclose to the plaintiff the full 
extent of his injuries and the probable future disability to 
be expected therefrom, its false representation designed to 
conceal facts lmovvn to it and intended to prevent plaintiff's 
consulting· other physicians and thus hinder him from bring-
ing action until after the running of the statutory period of 
limitations, must be deemed to amount to fraud upon the 
plaintiff and to excuse any greater diligence on his part under 
the facts disclosed by the complaint. No fact as to the plain-
tiff's condition is alleged which could be deemed to have put 
him on earlier notice.'' 
[5a] It would appear from the foregoing, that the fiduciary 
relationship of physician and patient excused plaintiff from 
greater diligence in determining the cause of his injury and 
that he was not, therefore, put on notice by the knowledge 
received by him on September 2, 1949 that his leg was to be 
amputated, that the cause thereof was negligence on the part 
of these defendants. 
In Kimball v. Pacific Gas &; Elec. Co., 220 Cal. 203, 210 
[30 P.2d 39], this court said: "vVe are of the opinion, how-
ever, that independent of statute, a fraudulent concealment 
by the defendant of the facts upon which a legal common-law 
action is based, under the proper circumstances, tolls the 
statute until discovery and that upon discovery the statute 
applicable to that particular action (in this case sec. 340, 
subd. 3, of Code Civ. Proc.) then commences to run." And 
held (p. 215) : "vVe, therefore, hold that the better view and 
the one supported by the cases in this state and by the 
\creight of authority elsewhere is that as far as a legal action 
for personal injuries is concerned, the fraudulent conceal-
ment by the defendant of the facts upon the existence of 
which the cause of action depends tolls the statute, and such 
statute does not begin to run until the discovery by plaintiff 
or until by reasonable diligence the plaintiff should have dis-
covered the facts." It was held there that even though plain-
tiff pleaded fraud and concealment to toll the statute, the 
same rules should apply as if section 338, subdivision 4. of 
the Code of Civil Procedure3 were relied upon. The court, 
quoting from Original Min. & Mill Co. v. Casad, 210 Cal. 
71, 75 [290 P. 456], said: "It will be discovered upon an 
3
' 'An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. The cause 
of action in such case not to be deemed to have aecmod until the 
discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or 
mistnke." (Code Civ. Proc., ~ 3il8, suhd. 4.) 
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analysis of the above cases that there are three major allega-
tions that must be contained in the complaint before it will 
be held sufficient: 1. The complaint must allege when the fraud 
was discovered; 2. The circumstances under which it was dis-
eovered and, 3. Pacts must be alleged to show that plail;ltiff 
is not at fault for failing to discover the fraud sooner, and 
that the plaintiff has no actual or presumptive knowledge of 
facts sufficient to put him on inquiry.'' 
Plaintiff alleged that on August 2, 1950, he discovered 
that defendants Shultz, Meier and Ferree had knowledge of 
the seriousness of his condition, through reports theretofore 
made by them to the State Compensation Insurance Fund. 
As we have heretofore seen, the confidential relationship exist-
ing between a patient and his physician or physicians would 
excuse plaintiff from any greater diligence on his part. It 
would appear, therefore, that plaintiff's second cause of action 
alleges sufficient facts to toll the statute of limitations. 
As to defendant Gillis, plaintiff alleges that his leg was 
amputated by this defendant on September 22, 1949, and that 
"plaintiff is now informed and believes and placing his allega-
tions on that ground alleges that with the application of the 
proper knowledge and skill said left leg could still been [sic] 
saved and have been of use and benefit to plaintiff." While, 
again, the phraseology of the allegations leaves much to be 
desired, it is apparent that the gravamen of the complaint 
against defendant Gillis is that the amputation could have 
been avoided by proper, skillful care and treatment. A fur-
ther allegation charges that as a "direct and proximate re-
>mlt" of the "careless, neglignece [sic] and unskillful acts 
... [and] omissions ... " of all defendants, plaintiff suf-
fered the amputation of his leg, etc. [6a] It is also apparent 
that this first cause of action against defendant Gillis is not 
barred by the statute of limitation inasmuch as plaintiff's 
original complaint was filed on September 12, 1950. [7] De-
fendant Gillis is also charged with fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions and concealment and from what has been heretofore 
said, it appears that defendant Gillis is estopped from taking 
advantage of the statute of limitation. We said in Pashley 
v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., supra, 25 Cal.2d 226, 231, "In reality 
the ground of relief is that the defendant, having by fraud 
or deceit concealed material facts and by misrepresentations 
hindered the plaintiff from bringing an action within the 
statutory period, is estopped from taking advantage of his 
own wrong." 
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There is an additional reason the demurrers as to the 
second cause of action were not well taken. Plaintiff alleged 
that his leg was 1949. If, 
as has been said Gas & Elec. 
p. 214) : " ... the rule is well settled that in a 
ease the statute starts to run from the date the 
If he is deemed to have 
of these defendants at the time his 
his action vms eommenced in time. 
that he should not be deemed to have 
or notice, until he received the 
fendants Meier and :B'erree 
until that time he did not have 
defendants knew, and concealed 
his eondition. 
within the 
DEMURRER O:!<' DEJ;'ENDAN'l'S SHUL'rz AND MEIER 
[8] These defendants also demurred on the ground that 
several causes of action were united but not separately stated. 
Plaintiff's complaint as heretofore sets forth in num-
bered, separate the as to each de-
fendant, or group and consists of two causes·of action 
as to each defendant, or group It has been pointed 
out that the allegations of the first cause of action are sufficient 
to state a cause of action for and those of the 
second to toll the statute of limitations. This ground of de-
murrer is not well taken. Each cause of action against each 
defendant or group thereof is stated not only as to 
defendants but as to the of time which plain-
tiff was under the care aud treatment of such defendant, or 
defendants. If the demurrer was meant to be on the ground 
that causes of action tlwFle defendants were improperly 
joined, that contention is answered to defendants 
by reason of the rule set forth in v. Smith, 24 Cal.2d 
124, 129, 130 [148 P.2d We said 
there : ''Although the before us is far from being a 
model of clarity, concisenee;s, or consistency, it does fairly 
appear therefrom that Wanda Kraft sustained cer-
tain severe physical that the defendants were sever-
ally and successively to treat such injuries, that 
each defendant was in the treatment he administered, 
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other or both 
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result of the negligence of one or the 
defendants the plaintiff Wanda Kraft 
neither defendant 
caused the independent tort of his 
himself did not proximately con-
that neither defendant 
will have been 
occasioned their in the one action. If it develops 
that only one defendant was in his treatment the 
assessment of the verdict will be If, on the other 
hand, it appears that of both defendants con-
tributed to cause an injury for which plaintiff 
is entitled to recover, it may be a matter entailing great dif-
ficulty of as to the mnount in which each defendant is 
responsible.'' And: ''The facts that defendants are not joint 
tort feasors but and that their negli-
gence rather than concurrently in time 
to produce the are not vetitive of the right of joinder. 
The salutary procedure afforded by sections 379a, 379b and 
379c of the Code of Civil Procedure is clearly intended to be 
available upon a either that the negligence of two or 
more persons, whether joint, independently concurrent, or 
successive, contributed proximately to cause the injury for 
which recovery is or that the injury for which re-
covery is was proximately caused by the negligence of 
one or another or several of two or more persons and, as to 
each person who is not charged absolutely, that a reasonable 
uncertainty, requiring determination of some factual or legal 
issue, exists in respect to alternative or quantitative liability.'' 
(Pp. 130, 131.) 
It appears then that this ground of demurrer was not well 
taken and should not have been sustained. 
These defendants also demurred upon the ground that the 
complaint was unintelligible and ambiguous in 
that it could not be ascertained whether the negligence on their 
part consisted of a failure to the leg free from infection 
or negligence in for and treating the leg; and that 
it cannot be ascertained whether are charged with negli-
gence in to the and nerve and in failing 
to remove accumulated blood and, if so, whether plaintiff is 
charging that any resulted; and that it cannot be 
ascertained what acts defendants are charged with failure to 
perform in order to have properly combated an infection. 
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The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that defendants 
neglected properly to care for his leg as a result of which 
the leg was amputated, to his damage and loss. [9] As was 
said in Greninger v. Fischer, supra, 81 Cal.App.2c1 549, 552, 
it was not necessary for plaintiff to allege in what respect the 
treatment given him might have been deficient so long as the 
allegations of the complaint charged the breach of a legal 
duty, proximate causation and resulting damage. 
[10] Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the 
claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may 
be stricken out or disregarded. (21 Cal.Jur., p. 24, § 11; 
Brea v. McGlashan, 3 Cal.App.2d 454, 460 [39 P.2d 877] ; 
Kidwell v. General Petrolet~m Corp., 212 Cal. 720, 723 [300 
P. 1, 76 A.I.~.R. 830] ; M~orlock v. Fink, 81 Cal.App. 686, 
690 [254 P. 578] .) 
It follows, therefore, that the demurrer of defendants 
Shultz and Meier should have been overruled. 
DEMURRER OF DEFENDANT FERREE 
In addition to the grounds of demurrer heretofore set forth 
on which all defendants demurred and which have been dis-
missed, defendant Arthur Ferree demurred on the ground that 
plaintiff's first cause of action was uncertain, ambiguous and 
unintelligible because it could not be ascertained "how or 
in what manner it is contended that this demurring defendant 
was careless, negligent and unskillful" so far as the treat-
ment of plaintiff was concerned. As heretofore noted, it was 
unnecessary for plaintiff to allege in detail the facts on which 
the alleged negligence of the defendant rested. [11] Negli-
gence may be pleaded in general terms in malpractice cases 
as well as in other types of negligence (Greninger v. Fischer, 
st~pra, 81 Cal.App.2d 549, 552.) 
CONTENTIONS OF DEJ<'ENDANTS 
[12] All defendants contend that plaintiff was put on 
notice of the extent of his injury because the proceeding:s 
under the Workmen's Compensation Act were "public 
record [ s]. The plaintiff, was, therefore, put on inquiry as 
to everything that it disclosed and, therefore, cannot hide be-
hind his indolence in failing to pursue that which he was 
bound to inquire about and thus base his claim to an exten-
sion of the statute." All defendants rely upon Crabbe v. 
White, 113 Cal.App.2d 356 [248 P.2d 193], Sonbergh v. Mac-
Quarrie, 112 Cal.App.2d 771 [247 P.2d 133] and Huysman v. 
May 1954] STAFFORD v. SHULTZ 
/42 C.2d 767; 270 P.2d 11 
783 
Hirsch, 6 Cal.2d 302 [57 P.2d 908], in support of this con-
tention. Crabbe v. White, supra, involved a will which had 
been filed for probate and the court held that a will, when 
filed, became a matter of public record and that means of 
knowledge, especially where it consisted of public records, 
vvas deemed in law to be knowledge. Sonbergh v. JJfacQuarrie, 
snpra, is not in point. The court there held that a complaint 
not filed until two years and ten months after the alleged 
assault was not filed in time in the absence of any allegation 
of fraud, concealment or- dtwess on the part of defendant 
which would have prevented the plaintiff fr-mn ascertaining 
earlier- that he had suffered inJury at the hands of the de-
fendant. Hnysman v. Ki1·sch, sttpra, holds, as heretofore set 
forth, that the statute of limitations should not run against 
a plaintiff's cause of action until that plaintiff had knowledge 
thereof, or should, in the exercise of due care and diligence, 
have acquired knowledge thereof. No authority has been 
cited, nor can any be found, which provides that physicians' 
reports to the State Compensation Insurance Fund of Cali-
fornia shall constitute "public records" so as to give con-
structive notice as provided for by section 19 of the Civil Code 
("Every person who has actual notice of circumstances suffi-
cient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular 
fact, has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in 
whieh, by prosecuting such inquiry, he might have learned 
such fact.") It would appear, therefore, that there is no 
merit to this contention of defendants. 
[13] All defendants, with the exceptiou of Dr. Ferree, 
contend that plaintiff's complaint does not state a cause of 
aetion because "[I]t is fundamental that a surgeon does not 
undertake to perform a cure, nor does he contract to use 
the highest degree of care, but will use ordinary care and 
skill as tested by the practice of responsible members of his 
profession in his community." This, it would appear, is a 
matter of evidence and not a valid contention upon an appeal 
from a judgment entered after the sustaining, without leave 
i·o amend, of a demurrer to a complaint. As we said in 
Huysman Y. Kirsch, supra, 6 Ca1.2d 302, 313: "However, 
statements of counsel in their briefs relative to the evidence 
which may be produced at the trial have no bearing upon the 
question of the sufficiency of a complaint, and cannot be con-
sidered by the eourt in passing upon that question. (Stone 
v. hnperial Water Co., 173 Cal. 39, 43 [159 P. 164].)" 
[14] Defendant Feree contends that plaintiff's allega-
784 C.2d 
tions concerning the false made to 
him did not concern facts "but were in the nature of 
a prophecy as to the events to in the future." It is 
argued that the question, in such a case, is whether the belief 
was actually and entertained those the 
representations. 'Nonld appear to be a matter of evi-
dence (II~~ysman v. a valid objection 
to the sufficiency of said that this con-
tention has even 
fact that a 
Rasmussen v. 
in support of this contention involved 
motion for a and the com·t was 
evidence produced by the 
cures. 
P.2d 184], cited 
the granting of a 
concerned with the 
[15] Defendants' of parties 
defendant found in their briefs has no merit in view of the 
fact that no demurrer was interposed on that ground (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 430) and in view of the discussion heretofore 
set forth. 
For the foregoing reasons tbe judgments are and each of 
them is reversed. 
Traynor, J., Spence, .J., and Bray, J. pro tem.,* concurred. 
Edmonds, .J., concurred in the judgment. 
*Assigned by Chairman of J udlcial Council. 
